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Sunday 6 March 2016

UNIFICATION OF INTELLIGENT & INTELLIGIBLE

UNIFICATION of INTELLIGENT and INTELLIGIBLE
G. Ibrahimi Dinani, Tehran University, Iran

ABSTRACTS
The question of unification between the Intelligent and Intelligible has been discussed since the olden times; the matter has also been attended to by Islamic philosophers. There are those such as Ibn Sina who vehemently oppose this unification and those like Sadr‐ul Muta’liheen Shirazi, and his followers, who are inclined towards the unification between all genres of the ‘Perceiver and Perceived’, including that of the Intelligent and Intelligible. The latter have proved this concept by means of the ‘demonstration of correlation’.
Demonstration of correlation is based on a series of fundamental principles to which one must pay attention. The author has attained another way for proving the unification between the Intelligent and Intelligible and the paper aims to explain this method in detail. Proving this matter (of unification) bears major importance in the field of ‘Ma’rifat‐shinasi’ (Epistemology); however, one can employ this method to solve many of the existing problems and difficulties. Sadr‐ul Muta’liheen Shirazi’s theory on the subject of the unification between the intelligent and Intelligible may be compared to that which is proposed by Husserl’s i.e. concerning intuition existence; the latter should be discussed at a later, more convenient time.

The rule of the union of the intelligent and intelligible had been posed since the olden times; and Porphyry is said to have discussed this issue in details. The Muslim philosophers also have paid attention to this rule. Ibn‐Sina, however, has rejected it. On the other hand, philosophers such as Mulla Sadra and his followers had staunch belief in this principle, and alleged arguments to prove it. To prove this rule, Mulla Sadra has appealed to the argument of correlation (tadayuf). In this argument, he has relied on some fundamental principles, which play important roles in this argument.

THESE PRINCIPLES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. The actual forms, which always make up the actuality of things are of two kinds: one, the actual forms, which depend on the matter and space; and the other, the actual forms, which are free of the matter, time, space…The actual form, which depends on the matter and its concomitants, will never become the essential intelligible; and even if it is called "intelligible", it is, in fact, accidental intelligible. The actual form, which is separate from the matter and its concomitants, however, is always the essential intelligible. Thus, the intelligibles are of two kinds: one, the essential intelligible, i.e. a separate and intellectual form, which depends on the mind; and the other, the accidental intelligible, which is the objective form of the thing in the external world, which depends on the matter.

2. The philosophers are of one accord that the existence of the intelligible is always to be intellected by the intelligent; that is, the psychical existence of the intelligible form is nothing but the existence of the form of the intelligible which is intellected by the intelligent. In other words, the essential knowledge of the actual intelligible and its existence, which is intellected by the intelligent are identical; and there is no discrepancy involved.

3. An intelligible form, which is separate from the matter and depends on the mind, is always an actual intelligible, whether there is, out of its essence, an intelligent to intellect it or not. Thus, the intelligibleness of the actual intelligible could be in no way divided, since its essence is the intelligibleness, and no other title but the intelligibleness can be applied to it.

The intelligibleness for the essential intelligible is not like the movingness for the body; since in the latter case, if we ignore the movingness of the body, the attribute of being a moving body will be negated from the body, the attribute of being a body, however, remains intact. As regards the actual intelligible, however, if we ignore the attribute of the intelligibleness, no other thing will remain. Thus the attribute of the essence of the actual intelligible is intelligibleness, and has no other thing but the intelligibleness. Thus the actual intelligible is always the essential intelligible. Taking what has been already said into consideration, Mulla Sadra’s argument, which is called the argument of correlation, can be understood; for what is, whether there is another thing or not, actual intelligible, in its essence, will be, according to the rule of correlation, the actual intelligent as well.

As regards the correlation, it is agreed that two correlative things are correspondent in existence as well, and thus if one of them is potential, the other one also will be potential, and if it is actual, the other one is actual as well.

From the previous promises it is concluded that the actual intelligible, which, whether is other thing or not, is intelligible, is the actual intelligent to intellect itself well. And thus the rule of the union of the intelligent and intelligible is realized. Here it may be said that the point, mentioned by Mulla Sadra, that the intelligible, whether there is other thing or not, is not free of the objections; for, if we demonstrate the union of the intelligent and intelligible through the argument of correlation, it means that the intelligible is intelligible only when there is an intelligent to intellect it, and since the intelligible is always in correlation with the intelligent, one of them can never be intellected without the other. Thus how can it be claimed that the actual intelligible, whether there is other thing or not, is intelligible?

Among those who have interjected this objection and then answered it is Hakim Sabzawari. He says: when we speak of the actual intelligible, the existence and the reality of the intelligible form, which is the origin of separation of the intelligibleness, is meant. Thus the objective reality of a thing is among the independent and non‐correlative realities, which the notion of correlative is applied to it in the mind. This holds for the cause and the effect as well; since two notions of the causeness and causedness are correlated, and according to the rule of correlation they should be correspondent as well; whereas, according to the philosophers, the cause is always prior over the caused (effect). So when we say that the cause is prior over the caused (effect), we mean the existence of the cause, whereas the notions of the causeness and causedness are known, in the mind as correlated and correspondent ones.

The other way to prove the union of the intelligent and intelligible is to say that: what is intelligent, is intelligible as well, since if a thing intellects another thing, there occurs another intellection as well; that is, the intelligent thing intellects its own intellection on the intelligible thing; for, the intellection of the intelligent thing on the intelligible thing is the acquisition of the intelligible form by the intelligent. This acquisition, which itself is acquired by the intelligent, will not be concealed from the intelligent. Therefore, the intelligent thing always intellects its own intellection on the intelligible thing, and evidently the intelligent’s intellection is nothing but the intelligent itself. Thus, it could be claimed that what is intelligent is intelligible as well.

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COGITATION
[Q41_54] Indeed, they are in doubt about the encounter with their Lord! Indeed, He embraces all things!
[Q85_20] and Allah besieges them from all around.
[Q25_54] They ask you to hasten the punishment, and indeed hell will besiege the faithless

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